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 THE EVALUATION OF THE HIGH TEMPERATURE GAS COOLED REACTOR SAFETY TO 
FULFILL THE REQUIREMENT OF THE NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR. High temperature 
gas cooled reactor (HTGR) has been considered to be the most promising option to meet 
energy demands in the future. It has also been selected as the next generation nuclear plant. 
The primary safety requirement of the next generation nuclear plant design is to limit radioactive 
material releases to practically eliminate the need for public evacuation or sheltering beyond the 
exclusion area boundary. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the safety design of HTGRs in 
order to fulfill the requirement of the next generation nuclear plant. To achieve this objective, 
inherent safety features, fundamental safety functions, and confinement functions realized into 
the design of HTGRs are comprehensively evaluated. It is found that design provisions of 
HTGRs can fulfill the intention of keeping radionuclides at their original sources. The layers of 
the coated fuel particles are very robust to retain nuclear fission products for all foreseeable 
reactivity events. There will be no possibility of radioactive materials to be released even though 
related safety systems and operator intervention are not involved in the recovery actions. This 
design has complied with the requirement of the next generation nuclear plant, which is to 
practically eliminate the need for public evacuation or sheltering beyond the exclusion area 
boundary.  
 
ABSTRAK 
EVALUASI KESELAMATAN REAKTOR BERPENDINGIN GAS TEMPERATUR TINGGI 
DALAM MEMENUHI PERSYARATAN PEMBANGKIT NUKLIR MASA DEPAN. Reaktor 
berpendingin gas temperatur tinggi diprediksi akan menjadi pilihan yang menjanjikan untuk 
memenuhi kebutuhan energi masa depan. Persyaratan utama keselamatan bagi pembangkit 
nuklir masa depan adalah pembatasan pada lepasan material radioaktif sehingga secara praktis 
evakuasi dan sheltering diluar exclusion area boundary dapat dihilangkan. Tujuan penelitian ini 
adalah mengevaluasi desain keselamatan HTGR dalam memenuhi persyaratan pembangkit 
nuklir masa depan. Untuk mencapai tujuan ini maka fitur keselamatan melekat, fungsi 
keselamatan fundamental, dan fungsi pengungkungan yang diimplementasikan pada desain 
HTGR akan dievaluasi. Hasil evaluasi menunjukkan bahwa desain HTGR dapat mengungkung 
material radioaktif tetap berada pada sumbernya. Lapisan partikel bahan bakar mampu 
menahan produk fisi untuk setiap kejadian reaktifitas. Pelepasan material radioaktif tidak akan 
pernah terjadi meskipun intervensi sistem keselamatan dan operator tidak terlibat dalam aksi 
pemulihan. Dengan demikian, desain HTGR ini telah memenuhi persyaratan pembangkit nukli r 
masa depan yaitu tidak diperlukannya evakuasi dan shelter di luar exclusion area boundary. 
Kata kunci: Reaktor berpendingin gas temperatur tinggi, fitur keselamatan melekat, fungsi 
keselamatan fundamental, fungsi pengungkungan, pembangkit nuklir masa depan 
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1. INTRODUCTION* 
 
High temperature gas cooled reactor 
(HTGR) design technologies offer 
advantageous of higher fuel integrity, more 
resistance to proliferation, and simpler fuel 
cycle and refueling [1]. 
                                            
* Penulis korespondensi. 
   E-mail: purba-jh@batan.go.id 
 
 
HTGR also takes advantages of material 
properties to improve their safety, namely: (i) 
ceramic coated and carbon-based fuels to 
withstand extremely high temperature; (ii) 
graphite as the materials of the reactor to 
avoid chemical reaction producing explosive 
gases; (iii) plant design features to limit air or 
water ingress; (iv) single phase and low heat 
capacity of the helium coolant to minimize 
stored energy; and (v) inherent nuclear and 
Julwan H. Purba, Arya A. Waskita, dan D.T. Sony Tjahyani - Jurnal Pengembangan Energi Nuklir Vol. 21, No. 2, (2019) 71-78 
72 
heat transfer properties of the reactor design 
to maintain fuel temperatures within 
acceptable limits under all conditions.  
HTGR has been considered to be the 
most promising option to meet energy 
demands in the future [2-4]. It can generate 
electricity the thermal efficiency of which is 
higher than light water reactor (LWR) can 
generate. The practical challenges for nuclear 
power plants (NPPs) to become energy 
resources in the future are their safety 
operations and records. Therefore, safety 
issues become the most concern for operating 
and regulating institutions. They have to 
convince public that the related safety 
systems can manage and control the release 
during any accident. Public health and safety 
also need to be protected from possible 
radiation hazards during plants’ lifetime. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) stated that the design of the next 
generation nuclear plant should be able to 
limit radioactive material releases to 
practically eliminate the need for public 
evacuation or sheltering beyond the exclusion 
area boundary [5]. 
HTGR has been categorized as the next 
generation nuclear plant because of its safety 
design and reliability [5]. Design philosophy 
of HTGRs relies on inherent safety features 
and engineered passive safety features [5, 6]. 
These features can sufficiently control nuclear 
power without the need for active safety 
systems or operator intervention. 
Inherent safety features are achieved 
through TRISO-coated fuel particles, graphite 
moderator, and helium coolant. Meanwhile, the 
engineered passive safety features are 
achieved through the low-power-density core 
with a relatively large height-to-diameter 
ratio within an un-insulated steel reactor 
vessel and large negative temperature 
coefficient as well as large thermal margin to 
enable reactor to deal with scram failure. 
The purpose of this study is to 
comprehensively evaluate HTGR designs in 
order to practically eliminate the need for 
public evacuation or sheltering beyond the 
exclusion area boundary. Safety design of 
HTGR to be reviewed and discussed are 
inherent safety features, fundamental safety 
functions, and confinement functions. 
Evaluations are done using various sources of 
data and information, such as scientific 
publications and IAEA publications as well as 
lecture materials. The HTGR design to be 
evaluated in this study is HTGR modular, 
whose power is less than 300 MWth. 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
The fundamental objective of the safety 
measures in nuclear power plants is to protect 
people and the environment from harmful 
effects of ionizing radiation. To be selected as 
the next generation nuclear plant (NGNP), 
HTGR design needs to be confirmed that 
public evacuation or sheltering beyond the 
exclusion area boundary can be practically 
eliminated. 
In this study, three design philosopies of 
HTGR, i.e. inherent safety features, 
fundamental safety functions and confinement 
functions are explored. HTGR inherent safety 
features include TRISO-coated fuel particles, 
graphite moderator, and helium coolant. HTGR 
fundamental safety functions include 
controlling heat generation, removing heat 
from the reactor core, and controlling 
chemical attacks. Meanwhile, HTGR 
confinement functions include fuel particle 
kernel, fuel particle coating, core graphite and 
carbonaceous materials, helium pressure 
boundary, and reactor building. All collected 
data and information are, then, evaluated and 
classified into  those three design philosophies 
to achieve research objectives.  
Various sources of available scientific 
publications are used to collect data and 
information on HTGR design philosophies. 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The primary safety objective of the next 
generation nuclear plant is to limit radioactive 
material releases to practically eliminate the 
need for public evacuation or sheltering 
beyond the exclusion area boundary [5]. 
Three design concepts of HTGR to achieve 
this primary safety objective are inherent 
safety features, fundamental safety functions 
and confinement functions. 
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3.1.  HTGR Inherent Safety Features 
 
To fulfill energy demands in the future, 
HTGR achieve inherent safety features 
through the selection and utilization of 
excellent material properties. HTGR design 
provision to achieve these inherent safety 
features are through TRISO-coated fuel 
particles, graphite moderator, and helium 
coolant [7]. 
 
3.1.1. TRISO-coated fuel particles 
 
TRISO-coated fuel particle consists of a 
fissionable fuel kernel, which is surrounded by 
four coating layers [8, 9]. Those four coating 
layers are porous pyrolytic carbon (PyC) 
buffer, dense inner pyrolytic carbon (IPyC), 
chemically vapour deposited silicon carbide 
(SiC), and dense outer pyrolytic carbon 
(OPyC), which are respectively designed from 
the kernel to the outside of each fuel particle 
as in Fig. 1. The purpose of those layers is to 
contain fission products and actinides through 
the lifetime of the fuel particles [10]. These 
are key elements in the HTGR design and 
licensing. 
The TRISO-coated fuel particles can 
withstand temperatures, which are much 
higher than the metal clad fuels can. They can 
even withstand extremely high temperatures 
and retain high radionuclides. They can 
maintain their abilities to retain radionuclides 
if the temperature is still at about 1600 0C 
[11]. In fact, this temperature will not be 
exceeded in any accident of HTGRs [12]. 
 
 
Figure. 1. TRISO-coated fuel particle [13]. 
 
Two main factors, which might affect 
the integrity of TRISO-coated fuel particles 
are temperature and burn-up [14]. In addition, 
fuel particle failures can also be affected by 
irradiation history and manufacturing 
processes. Fortunately, the failure of one 
coated fuel particle will not cause 
neighbouring coated fuel particles to fail such 
as in LWRs, which can cause significant 
additional failures.  The coated fuel particle 
failure mechanisms are initiated only by 
maximum fuel temperature. Even though there 
are coated fuel particle failures, these failures 
will not change the heat removal path. This 
condition will not affect the fuel cool-ability 
and hence, the integrity of those coated fuel 
particles are still maintained to retain 
radionuclides within their sources. 
 
3.1.2. Graphite moderator 
 
Graphite moderator complements the 
extremely high temperature capability of the 
fuels. It can even withstand temperatures 
higher than the fuel can without structural 
damage. Moreover, graphite moderator 
provides large heat capacity and low power 
density resulting in temperature transients to 
be very slow and predictable. Therefore, the 
peak accident temperatures will be reached 
within days when the coolant is completely 
lost. However, this peak temperature is still 
well below temperatures, which could cause 
fuel degradation. This condition allows long 
thermal response times. For example, in loss 
of forced circulation accident, the fuel peak 
temperature will only be reached after several 
days and then slowly decrease [15]. 
In addition, graphite can retain certain 
radionuclides to possibly reduce releases from 
the core. Furthermore, the graphite strength 
can increase with temperature over the full 
range of temperatures applicable to the 
HTGRs. 
 
3.1.3. Helium coolant 
 
HTGRs use helium gas, which is 
pressurized to several megapascals, as the 
primary system medium for heat transferring. 
Helium coolant is chemically inert and has 
high thermal capacity. Furthermore, helium is 
neutronically transparent and, hence, it will 
not participate in any chemical or nuclear 
reaction to aggravate an accident. In addition, 
helium will not have two-phase flow problem, 
which could affect reactivity and temperature 
control such as in LWRs. 
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The major concerns for the 
commercialization of the HTGRs are the 
primary helium leakage and coolant chemistry 
during their operations. Tochio et al. [16] 
confirmed that helium gas is easy to leak, 
especially at the elevated temperatures and 
pressures. Therefore, it is necessary to tightly 
control the possibility of the primary helium 
leakage to prevent the radioactive material 
releases into the environment. To minimize 
the effect of helium leakage if it really 
happens, a leakage monitoring system is 
necessary to identify the location of the 
leakage. Furthermore, helium coolant 
chemistry also needs to be tightly controlled 
to prevent graphite and metallic material 
oxidization. Sakaba, Hamamoto and Takeda 
[17] found that even though chemical impurity 
can be removed to as low as possible from 
helium coolant, it can only maintain core 
integrity but the mechanical strength and heat 
transfer efficiency of the high-temperature 
equipment applied in HTGRs still degrade. 
Even though helium leaks out from the 
primary pressure boundary into the reactor 
building, it will not condense but will elevate 
the pressure in a sealed reactor building, 
which cannot be reduced by cool down. This 
sustained high-pressure will largely delay the 
release as fuel temperature increases. This 
condition is very different from LWRs in the 
case of loss of coolant accidents. These 
characteristics can prevent the release of 
radioactive materials from their sources. 
 
3.2. HTGR Fundamental Safety Functions 
 
The integrity of the fuels needs to be 
maintained to prevent or mitigate radiological 
consequences to people and the environment 
in any state and condition. HTGR fundamental 
safety functions to maintain the integrity of 
the fuels are by (i) controlling heat generation; 
(ii) removing heat from the reactor core; and 
(iii) controlling chemical attacks. 
 
3.2.1. Controlling heat generation 
 
Heat generation in HTGRs is controlled 
by two different systems, i.e. an intrinsic 
shutdown system and a reliable control 
material insertion system. The intrinsic 
shutdown system is performed by a very large 
core negative temperature coefficient and 
large thermal margin. In addition, the reliable 
control material insertion system is realized 
through two independent and diverse 
reactivity control systems, i.e. a control rod 
drop system and a backup or reserve 
shutdown system, which can fall down by 
gravity. Each system can maintain sub-
criticality independently and one of those 
systems is capable of maintaining cold 
shutdown during refuelling. These safety 
systems are designed such as to functionally 
support active systems, namely: control and 
protection systems, and reactivity control. 
 
3.2.2. Removing heat from the reactor core 
 
Although engineered safety systems do 
not work, HTGRs is still capable of removing 
heat from the core due to the large thermal 
capacity, high thermal conductivity and low 
power density of the core. Small thermal 
rating or low core power density can limit the 
amount of decay heat and provide low linear 
heat rate. Graphite structure allow high heat 
capacity and, therefore, to slow the heat up of 
the graphite core. Moreover, the geometry of 
the core has been designed to be long, slender 
and annular cylindrical geometry. It is 
surrounded by an un-insulated reactor vessel. 
This design can effectively remove heat 
through conduction, convection, and radiation. 
This design also assures sufficient core 
residual heat removal under loss-of-forced 
cooling or loss-of-coolant-pressure 
conditions. 
The depressurized loss of forced cooling 
(DLOFC) is a typical accident in HTGRs, which 
imposes the strongest requirements for 
removing heat from the reactor core. Zheng, 
Y., Shi, L. [18] studied DLOFC and 
pressurized LOFC (PLOFC) accidents using 
THERMIX code based on HTR-PM design. 
They found that, due to passive heat removal 
capabilities, the maximum temperatures of the 
fuel element and the reactor pressure vessel 
(RPV) are still below the design limit with a 
large safety margin. The passive heat removal 
capability of HGTRs is graphically shown in 
Fig. 2 [19]. 
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Figure. 2. Passive heat removal capability [19]. 
The function of the reactor cavity 
cooling system (RCCS) is to maintain the 
structure and reactor building concrete 
temperatures within allowable limit [20]. The 
RCCS itself is cooled by natural convection of 
air or water. If RCCS were unavailable, heat 
from reactor vessel walls would be 
transferred to the reactor concrete walls 
through the inoperable RCCS and to the 
ground surrounding the reactor building. This 
heat transfer mechanism is still sufficient to 
retain the maximum temperature of the core 
to be well below its design limit. Through this 
mode, vessel creep deformation at the core 
mid plane is likely to occur after several days 
[5]. 
Those passive heat removal systems are 
designed such as to functionally support two 
active cooling systems, i.e. main loop cooling 
system and shutdown cooling system (SCS). 
When the main loop cooling system is 
unavailable, the shutdown cooling system is 
responsible for removing residual heat. This 
system includes non-safety related small 
circulator and heat exchanger, which are 
located at the bottom of the reactor vessel. 
 
3.2.3. Controlling chemical attacks 
 
Chemical attacks can challenge the 
integrity of the fuel particles and graphite 
core structure by possibly ingressing into the 
primary system. Two types of chemical 
attacks, which possibly challenge the integrity 
of the HTGR fuel particles, are air ingress and 
water ingress. Air ingress can potentially 
damage TRISO coated fuel particles and the 
vessel graphite structures and components 
through oxidation. Meanwhile, water ingress 
could cause three major safety concerns, i.e. 
positive reactivity insertion, graphite 
corrosion, and potential breach in the 
radioactivity confinement [21]. 
Large amounts of air ingress or water 
ingress accident can be categorized as one of 
HTGR design extension conditions [22]. 
During air and/or water ingress accidents, the 
core temperature is a function of time. Similar 
to the depressurization accident, the core 
temperature temporarily decreases due to 
reactor scram. Due to residual heat, the core 
temperature will increase after the fuel 
temperature and graphite block temperature 
are almost the same. After that condition is 
reached, the core temperature gradually 
decreases [23]. 
Design provisions to limit the effect and 
amount of air ingress in HTGRs are to slow 
down oxidation rate. This can be achieved by 
providing high integrity nuclear grade 
pressure vessels, limiting core flow area and 
friction losses, embedding ceramic-coated 
particles, and venting reactor building. 
Meanwhile, design provisions to limit the 
effect and amount of water ingress are to limit 
source of water. Steam generator isolation, 
steam generator dump system, endothermic 
reaction of water-graphite, and graphite 
coated fuel particle are provided for that 
purpose [20]. 
 
3.3.  HTGR Confinement Functions 
 
HTGR design provisions for confinement 
functions are fuel particle kernel, fuel particle 
coating, core graphite and carbonaceous 
materials, helium pressure boundary, and 
reactor building. They work independently in 
series. If one level of barrier were to fail, the 
subsequent barrier would be available. The 
effectiveness of those five barriers to contain 
radionuclides depends on a number of factors, 
such as radionuclide chemistry and half-lives, 
irradiation history, and events challenging the 
fuels. 
 
3.3.1. Fuel particle kernel 
 
The fuel particle kernel is the first 
barrier to radionuclide release. The main 
objectives of this kernel are to contain fissile 
and fertile materials and to retain fission 
products. It can retain short-lived fission 
gases such as Kr-88 and I-131 up to a 
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substantial fraction of greater than 95% under 
normal operating conditions. Unfortunately, its 
effectiveness to retain fission gasses can be 
reduced to 80-90% by elevated temperatures 
at the peak temperature locations [5]. Fuel 
particle kernel could be failure to retain gases 
if the kernel is hydrolysed by water vapour, 
which might present in the helium coolant. 
Fortunately, HTGR design provisions have 
been such as to limit the effect and amount of 
possible water and/or air ingress as described 
in Sub-Section 3.2.3. 
 
3.3.2. Fuel particle coating 
 
The fuel particle coating is the second 
and the most important barrier to retain 
fission gasses within the kernel, particularly in 
accident conditions. The fuel particle coating 
with successive layers from the kernel to the 
outer side are PyC buffer, dense IPyC, 
chemically vapor deposited SiC, and dense 
OPyC. The PyC buffer layer is to prevent the 
damage of coatings from fission fragments and 
to provide room for generated fission gases. 
Meanwhile, the dense IPyC layer is to 
attenuate the migration of fission products and 
to reduce chemical interaction between fission 
products and the SiC layer. The SiC layer is 
an excellent barrier for radioactive gases and 
metallic fission product. It has an excellent 
high temperature. The OPyC acts as barrier to 
fission products. It also chemically and 
mechanically protects the SiC layer. In regard 
to fission product absorption, the buffer layer 
has a lower density than other three layers 
[22]. 
Due to neutron irradiation, Liang et al. 
[24] found that (1) the buffer layer will 
experience cracks when the burn-up larger 
than 40,000 MWd/t; (2) PyC layer will undergo 
shrinkage to finally develop tensile stress, 
which can generate compression stress to the 
SiC layer; and (3) SiC layer will experience 
thermal decomposition at temperatures above 
1600 0C. Yang and Allen [25] conclude that 
SiC and PyC coating layers play an important 
role to provide a barrier to the release of 
gaseous fission product from the kernel. The 
integrity of the TRISO layers to retain gases 
and metallic fission products is still intact for 
temperatures of approximately 1600 0C. 
Above 1700 0C, their mechanical integrities 
gradually degrade. 
Among those four layers, the SiC layer 
is the most important layer. The fractures of 
the SiC layer are usually perceived as the 
fracture of the TRISO. The SiC layer has the 
greatest strength and irradiation stability [26]. 
Its functions as a spherical pressure vessel to 
be the primary barrier for the fission products, 
which might escape from the kernel and can 
diffuse through the carbon layers [13]. Since 
SiC coating layer will react with air and water 
under air or water ingress accidents, it is 
important to improve the resistance of the SiC 
layer to the oxidation process [23]. In 
addition, chemical mechanisms, such as kernel 
migration, corrosion and decomposition, can 
also challenge the integrity of the SiC layer at 
the temperature over 2000 OC [14]. 
 
3.3.3. Core graphite and carbonaceous 
materials 
 
The implementation of this third barrier 
depends on the type of the core. For the 
prismatic core, this third barrier is collectively 
accomplished by the fuel compact matrix and 
the fuel block graphite. For the pebble bed 
core, this third barrier is accomplished by the 
pebble matrix, which includes the unfuelled 
outer shell of the spherical pebble fuel 
element. Reactor materials are chemically 
compatible and will not react to produce heat 
or explosive gases. These characteristics can 
prevent the release of radioactive materials. 
Sumita, Shimazaki and Shibata [27] 
tested the integrity of the core components 
and graphite core support structures of 
HTGRs using high temperature Engineering 
Test Reactor (HTTR). They confirmed that 
during the high temperature of 950 OC 
continuous operations, the structural integrity 
of the core components and its graphite 
support structures was still maintained and, 
therefore, there was no challenge to the core 
cooling capability. 
 
3.3.4. Helium pressure boundary 
 
The helium pressure boundary (HPB) is 
the forth barrier to contain radioactive 
releases within the primary system. Once the 
fission products have been conveyed by 
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helium coolant from the core, the helium 
purification system will efficiently remove 
gaseous and metallic fission products, which 
also might be transported from the core, to 
control chemical impurities in the helium [5]. 
The high quality of the pressure vessel 
and limitation of the penetrations can reduce 
the likelihood of the HPB to break. However, 
when a break occurs, helium coolant would 
flow out from the HPB until the pressure of 
the inside and the outside is equal. In the 
event of the loss of helium coolant, inherent 
safety features and passive systems can still 
maintain the temperature of fuel elements to 
be well below the temperature where the fuel 
degradation does not happen. Even in case of 
the reactor shutdown failure, there is no 
active emergency core cooling system 
required to function for the heat removal. 
Different from LWRs, there is no scenario in 
HTGRs that can lead to core melt. 
 
3.3.5. Reactor building 
 
The reactor building is the last barrier 
to radionuclide releases to the environment. It 
surrounds HPB and structurally protects 
helium pressure vessels and RCCS from 
external hazards. Its effectiveness to retain 
radionuclide is highly event specific. In 
GTHRT300, the leak rate of the reactor 
building is designed to be less than 5%/day 
under 10 mm H2O pressure difference and its 
design pressure is higher than 1.3 MPa. Due 
to the airtight closures in the pressure release 
stack, the reactor building leak rate can be 
limited to be less than its designed leak rate in 
the depressurization accident, such as 
simultaneous break of inner and outer pipes of 
the coaxial double piping to flow helium gas 
[28]. To deal with non-condensable helium, 
which might be contained within the reactor 
building, it is vented to provide safer design 
solution. 
  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
From the safety points of view, HTGRs 
have been designed as such to limit the 
possibility of the radioactive material 
releases. Inherent safety features to withstand 
high temperatures have been achieved 
through TRISO-coated fuel particles, graphite 
moderator, and helium coolant. Meanwhile, 
fundamental safety functions to maintain the 
integrity of the fuel have been achieved by 
controlling heat generation, removing heat 
from the reactor core, and controlling 
chemical attacks. In addition, confinement 
functions are realized into fuel particle kernel, 
fuel particle coating, core graphite and 
carbonaceous materials, helium pressure 
boundary, and reactor building. This safety 
provisions have fulfilled the requirement for 
the next generation nuclear plant, which is to 
practically eliminated public evacuation or 
sheltering beyond the exclusion area 
boundary. 
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